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The 1975-1978 maritime composite agreement. 
P.F. Albury* 
In 19 75, the maritime employers and unions negotiated a con1posite ma~itime agree-
lnent. By 1978 holvever, and despite the goodwill that had gone into its negotiation, the 
agreen1ent had disintegrated. Although this disintegration has been attributed to the failure 
to negotiate satisfactory lvage relativities, this explanation is seen as inadequate. This 
article intends to sholv that the problem of lvage relativities, rather than being a cause of 
this disintegration, was in fact only a synzpton of a more serious underl;)ing problem. 
Introduction 
The establishment in 1979 of the Whatnall Commission of Inquiry into wage relativities 
aboard New z ,ealand vessels was the final attempt by government to resolve a series of 
disputes that had been plaguing the maritin1e industry throughout the 1970s. The establish-
ment of the Commission cast into obscurity the very real efforts of the n1aritime unions 
and employers some years earlier, to solve this problen1 then1selves by the negotiation of a 
maritime composite agreement. 
The Composite Agreement was an attempt to bring together, in a single agreement, what 
had previously been contained in a nu1nber of separate agreetnents covering each of the 
maritime unions. The significance of the composite agreement lay in the developn1ent of an 
overall wage structure covering all those who went to sea irrespective of rank. The key was 
the fixing of a bench-mark, in this case the rate paid to the ship's Bosun, with all other 
rates a fixed percentage above or below according to rank. 
In 1978, the con1posite agreement disintegrated, and as a consequence, the Whatnall 
Comn1ission was set the task of resolving a nutnber of anon1aHes that had led to this 
disintegration. The changes, in terms of the actual monetary differences, made on the 
recon1mendations of the Con1mission were largely successful in reducing the conflict 
caused by these anomalies. To date however, no new con1posite agreement has been 
entered into by the maritin1e unions and the en1ployers. What was not resolved were the 
underlying problen1s of status relativities although the Comtnission was aware they existed 
(Whatnall, 1979). The purpose of this article is to exa1nine the problem of wage and 
status relativities and to show the underlying reasons why the composite agreement broke 
down as soon as it did. 
The organisational structure of ships 
To explain the relativities problem it is first necessary to .. describe the horizontal and 
vertical divisions of labour aboard any merchant ship. The priine task of any merchant ship 
is the profitable carriage of cargo from one place to another. To do this efficiently and 
safely, a number of functions 1nust be performed. The division of labour on board ship is 
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as follows : the Deck Department deals with the navigation, loading, unloading, and deck 
maintenance; the Engineering Department deals with propulsion, power su~pl~, machinery 
and engine room maintenance; the Radio Department deals with communtcattons, and the 
Provedore Department deals with the domestic requirements. . 
The horizontal division of labour is, by training, qualification and often tn law, very 
inflexible. An individual from one department is seldom able to perform the tasks required 
in another department. The differences between the mates' and engineers' training and 
qualifications will be used to illustrate these divisions. (The tenns "mates", "engineers" 
and "officers" are interchangeable in every day use; the former are the correct designations.) 
The training for a mate starts with a three or four year seagoing apprenticeship culminating 
in the award of a Second Mate's Certificate. This is then followed by compulsory sea-time 
and more Ministry of Transport (MOT) examinations until the mate acquires his Master 
Mariner's Certificate. For an engineer, the process starts with an engineering apprenticeship 
ashore, where he gains his trade qualifications after which he goes to sea. This is then 
followed by a number of MOT examinations interspersed by compulsory sea-time culmina-
ting in the award of a Chief Engineer's Certificate. 
The divisions between the engineering and deck departments generated by the method 
of training is reinforced by the content of that training. Without going into detail, the 
skills required to navigate, load and unload a ship are very different to those required to 
run and maintain large engines, and other ancillary equipment. As a consequence of this 
process, competence in one area leads in no way to competence in the other. Another 
factor which prevents any exchange of personnel between functions is the length of train-
ing time to gain a Master Mariner's or Chief Engineer's Certificate. A total period of ten 
years is not uncommon, and to the author's personal knowledge no individual has done 
both; training time involved being prohibitive, irrespective of inclination. The final, and 
perhaps most crucial, factor separating the departments is the legal status of their quali-
fications spelled out in the Shipping and Seamans Act 1952. Only the holder of a Master 
Mariner's certificate, may con1mand a ship, and the line of succession may only be through 
the mates. Similarly, only the holder of a Chief Engineer's certificate may take charge of 
• 
an engine room. 
The vertical divisions between ratings (the official designation for the seamen, motor-
men, cooks and stewards) and officers are generally less rigid than the horizontal divisions, 
except with regard to the issuing of commands. Those designated as "officers" have this 
right. Those designated , .. ratings" do not, and this division is quite clear in law. Other 
differences are very often of degree rather than of kind. The content of a seaman's training 
is also part of a mate's training, although the mate has considerably more to learn in order 
to become qualified. Other differences are those of custom and practice. For example, 
officers are generally permanent company employees, whereas in New Zealand, ratings are 
employed on an industry basis. 
In effect then, there are several distinct occupational groups on board ship, whose 
functional overlap is low, and whose functional rigidity does not permit any interchange 
of personnel. This functional differentiation may be seen in the coverage of the Maritime 
Unions. The New Zealand Merchant Service Guild ("the Guild"), represents mates, radio 
officers and pursers. The New Zealand Institute of Marine and Power Engineers ("the 
Institute") represents engineers, and electricians. The New Zealand Seamans' Union repre-
sents seatnen and motormen (engine roon1 ratings) while cooks and stewards have their 
?wn union. Given that these se~arate occupations are, of necessity, closely functionally 
Interdependent,. a.n.d that th.ose In them live in close proximity during their non-working 
hours, the possibthty of vanous types of conflict is high. The particular problem to have 
arisen in the New Zealand Merchant Navy is that of wage relativities. 
The problem of relativities 
Until the time t~e Whatnall ~ommission's findings were implemented, the rail-ferry 
n1ates had always enJoyed a margin of pay, rank for rank, approximately a half step ahead 
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of the engineers, unlike the rest of the industry where there was parity between the groups. 
This was the result of the master being in overall command and the only line of succession 
being through the mates. Given their functional importance, the rail-fer :y engineers re-
sented this differential, and believed that, rank for rank, they should be paid the same as 
the mates, except for the master who has the overall responsibility of command. On the 
other hand, the mates have maintained that there should be differential in view of the 
line of comn1and, and the extra training and responsibility required of them. 
Although this was a central issue in the various disputes, there were at least two others. 
There was the issue of the relativity between the fifth engineer and the senior engine room 
rating. Due to the workings of the pay structure, the engine room rating has often been 
paid more than the fifth engineer. This has caused resentment because the engineers 
maintain that a fifth engineer is an officer and, as such, has training and responsibilities 
that the rating does not. There has also been the problem of the wages of sea-going engin-
eers relative to shore engineers. With their background of shore training, sea-going engineers 
are able, far n1ore easily, to n1ake comparisons with their shore-based counterparts. They 
claiin that they should receive a n1argin over them because they are required to put up with 
tnore difficult conditions such as being away frotn home and living on the job 24 hours a 
day. These two problems, it seems, have largely been resolv·ed by the Whatnall ·Commission's 
recotnmendations and do not appear to be important issues any longer. 
The relativities problen1 between the mates and engineers is the subject of this article 
but, there are other issues that have emerged from time to time . There is evidence to 
suggest that there are problems of relativities between radio officers and mates, between 
chief stewards and cooks, and between officers in general, and ratings. There is also evi-
dence of a problem of the relativities between ship types, and the question of the relativities 
between the New Zealand tnartime industry as a whole and other national maritime indus-
tries. These will not be pursued here. 
The ~composite agreement 
Some would argue that one way of dealing ·with the problem of wage relativities would 
be the formation of one maritime union covering all those who go to sea. As an interim 
step, it can be argued, a composite agreement reduces the possibility· of disputes because 
the problem becomes an inter-union problem rather than a union-en1ployer problem. 
The negotiation of the 1975 Agreement did not come "out of the blue'' but was the 
result of ideas that were current in a number of countries, and had been brought to the 
attention of many in the industry by the Rochdale Con1mittee of Inquiry ( 1970) into the 
UK shipping industry. The Jan1ieson Con1mission of Inquiry {1971) into the New Zealand 
shipping industry followed soon after the Rochdale Report and althought they were far 
less positive in their recotnm,endations, they did see close co-operation as being desirable, 
given that seafarers were literally "in the same boat". The impact of the then current 
fashion in New Zealand industry toward composite agreements probably had considerably 
less effect than the recon1mendations of the Rochdale Committee. National maritime 
industries are influenced more by the trends in other national marititne industries than by 
the trends in the industries in their hon1e countries. 
The first positive steps rnade towards the forn1ulation of the cotnposite agreement catne 
fron1 the n1aritime unions themselves with prompting from the MOT. Sources within the 
industry pointed out that pressure fron1 those at sea about "under-the-counter" deals 
between individual unions and individual employers was the reason for the unions entering 
into this kind of agreement. Many seafarers, it was clain1ed, saw such secrecy as being quite 
unnecessary and there was increasing pressure to have all employ1nent conditions out in 
the open. Such clain1s are difficult to substantiate, althought the author knows of at 
least one arrangement where such secrecy ·was the nonn. Until recently in the Articles of 
Agreement under the heading "Wages", the entry for the rnaster was AP A or As Per Agree-
ment. This referred to the agreen1ent on wages and conditions between the n1aster and the 
ship owner and was deerned to be private. It was difficult for anyone on board ship to 
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The spirit of co-operation which heralded the negotiation of the - aat to 
last. Although there had been reservations expressed, particularly "Y the 
the agreement was made, these reservations had been overruled in the ••• of co-
operation. In the next three years, however, the problems that gave rise to reserva-
tions emerged again and they were most acute aboard the rail ferries where the 
considered they had a real grievance. The problems were the long standing ones of relativi-
ties between engineers and mates, engineers and ratings, and to a leuer extent, betweea 
sea-going engineers and shore engineers. These problems led the Institute to withdraw frOID 
the agreement in 1978. The remaining unions tried to maintain the agreemeat butt with 
the re-emergence of old differences a year later, it fmally ctisintegrated. Subsequently, the 
Institute concluded a separate agreement with the New Zealand Railways giving the rail 
ferry engineers parity with the rail-ferry mates. This agreement, however, never came into 
force. The Government intervened and, in its place, issued regulations under the Economic 
Stabilization Act 1948; the ferry engineers eventually received a percentage in Hne 
with engineers in the rest of the industry (to achieve parity with the mates the eJl8ineers 
would have needed to receive a higher percentage). At the same time, the Wbatnall Commi-
ssion was established, and reported in December 1979. 
Despite changes in the pay structure in the industry consequent upon the WhatnaJJ 
Commission's recommendations, the whole problem of relativities continues to haunt all 
the parties involved. As one union official put it, "the whole thing is a pain in the arse", 
a sentiment echoed by other union officials and employers alike. The problem is now 
acute, the appropriate adjustment in relative salaries has been made on the Whatnall 
Commission's recommendation. It is suggested, however, that although these necessary 
adjustme_nts have been made, there are still some problems as yet unresolved, such as the 
relationship of wages to hours worked, and the relativity between the master and the 
chief engineer. 
An explanation 
Any explanation as to why the composite agreement should have faDed based exclusive-
ly on monetary differentials, is clearly inadequate for at least two reasons. First, the re-
sentment of er,gineers over wage relativities did not just appear in the 1970s. Discontent 
among engineers and others was certainly apparent throughout the 1960s and had been in 
evidence well before then. Why should there have been disputes over the issue in the 1970s 
and not before? Second, given the much improved rates of pay and time-off enjoyed by all 
seafarers, the issue of the actual monetary differences between the groups seems to be an 
adequate reason to account for the breakdown of the agreement, given the effort and the 
Maritime agreement 43 
apparent goodwill that had gone into its formulation. All this suggests that the reasons for 
the disintegration of the agreement should be sought elsewhere. The explanation proffered 
below is based on the results of maritime job satisfaction studies conducted in the UK and 
Scandinavia (Rogne, 1977; More by, 1975), and from a study of this type currently under-
way in this country. 
Status and change in the New Zealand merchant navy 
The key to any explanation as to why the composite agreement should have failed lies 
in the changes in the technology and structure of the New Zealand n1erchant navy in the 
1970s. In the mid-1970s, the New Zealand shipping industry began to feel the squeeze 
brought about by a general recession in world trade, and as a consequence the New Zealand 
ship owners decided to update their marine technology. Although the first steps had been 
taken by the Union Steam Ship Company with the introduction of the 'Ngatoro" class 
vessels in the 1960s, by the nlid-1970s this updating was well underway. (The "Ngatoro" 
class vessels use cranes to handle cargo, a far more efficient way than traditional cargo-
handling methods.) The key to continuing economic prosperity was seen by the industry 
as the ability to move more cargo n1ore quickly, and this resulted in an emphasis on faster 
voyage turn-around time, and larger ships. The most iinportant consequence for seafarers 
were fewer ships and less jobs, plus new IQnds of technology on board the ships. A 30 000 
deadweight tonnes ( dwt - the weight of cargo carried) ship carries no more crew than a 
3 500 dwt ship, and, of course, can move very much more cargo. (An extreme case of this 
can be seen where a 25 000 dwt traditional cargo vessel has a crew of 35, and a 350 000 
dwt tanker may carry a crew of 25 or less.) Although the reduction of jobs was mitigated 
to some extent by the increase in the titne-off arrangements, this did not substantially alter 
the overall employment situation. 
The changing technology drastically altered the traditional rewards for seafarers. In the 
case of ship's officers, a key reward is the status offered by the occupation. Studies over-
seas have shown that this status is, in large part, dependent upon the perceived competence 
of individuals to perfom1 well those key tasks necessary to n1ake the ship operate properly 
(Smith and Hatfield, 1974 and 1975; Wall, 1980). Wage differentials are a reflection of 
status differentials, and status differentials are affected by any changes in perceived compe-
tence. The introduction of new technology had had the effect of changing the nature of 
the tasks required, and consequently the areas of competence on which status is based. 
This point can be illustrated as follows. In the traditional cargo vessel, the cargo loading 
arrangements are a major task under the direction of the first rnate, and under the eye of 
the master. Where complicated stowage arrangements are needed, given the need to unload 
it often in a different order to that in which it was loaded, and the necessity to maintain 
adequate stability throughout the voyage, the first mate spends many hours, or days, 
deciding where the cargo should go. For the first n1ate this is a n1ajor function requiring 
skill and experience, and is crucial to the successful prosecution of a voyage. The introduc-
tion of a new technology in the fonn of containers, for exan1ple, alters this function 
completely. Not only does the first mate or master not know what is in the container, but 
given a port turn-around time of less than 24 hours, there is no possibility of working out 
a careful cargo plan. The complications arising from the loading and unloading of 1nany 
containers is best handled by computer, and the computer is invariably situated ashore 
under the control of shore personnel. 
The loading and unloading function, traditionally always done on board ship, has now 
been taken ashore with the consequent de-skilling of the first mate,s and master's jobs. 
They have been relegated as far as this function is concerned, to the position of supervisor. 
This de-skilling of various traditional jobs is difficult to enumerate fully but its effects are 
felt throughout the ship and in all departments. For exan1ple, the lack of traditional cargo-
handling gear on a container ship means that the deck ratings cannot exercise their skills 
in ~radition ,al seamanship tasks. 
Although general· dissatisfaction with the work is a consequence of the de-skilling of 
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relativities, the real problem was status differentials brousht about by teoba~ 
with wage differentials as a derived issue. . 
It has been argued then, that the main cause of the breakdown of., compOSite.-. 
ment lay in the fact that the wrong solution was atte1npted. The problem was by the 
parties as a wage issue whereas it was really a status issue which the cOlDpQiite 
did not affect. It may also be speculated that, despite the good intentions of the 
the closer co-operation brought about by the agreement may, in fact, have made the 
status problem more acute due to the closer proximity of the parties during subsequent 
negotiations. 
Since the Whatnall report of 1979, and the subsequent changes that have taken place 
in the wage structure, the problem of wage relativities has apparently been resolved. 
Except for the master and chief engineer, rank for rank, the mates and engineers are now 
paid the same. The differential between engineers and ratings, and sea-based and ~~lore­
based engineers has also been resolved, and some believe the problem should now go away. 
This belief, however, may well be overly optimistic in that at least one, if not two other 
problems remain. 
The first problem arises out of resolution, from the engineer's point of view, of the 
relativities issue. Although they are now satisfied with the equality of payment, rank for 
rank, there is some evidence that the mates are not. Although the problem for the mates is 
less acute, the limited research evidence suggests that mates consider that in the equalizing 
• 
of pay, insufficient account has been taken of the extra training and responsibility required 
because of the line of succession to command. They feel that because, in essence the mate's 
job is broader in scope than the engineer's, some kind of differential should be maintained 
apart from the existing differential between master and chief engineer. The problem is 
made more difficult because of the disagreement over work loads. The evidence suggests 
that even when mates do agree that, rank for rank, mates and engine~rs should be paid the 
same, there is the unspoken assumption that this equalling of wages is dependent on work 
loads being equal. The problem here is found in other occupations apart from the merchant 
navy and concerns the definition of work. This is essentially the same problem examined 
by Bain and Price (1972). For many engineers the physical nature of the work they are 
required to perform constitutes "real" work, whereas the non-physical work required of 
the mates does not. On the other hand, the mates point out, they are required to be on 
standby or involved in non-physical work for many more hours a day than the engineers. 
This problem does not suggest an immediate solution. 
The second problem is less clear, and involves the power relationships between the 
maritime unions and the employers. As the number of jobs were reduced during the 
1970s, seafarers perceived their whole occupation as being under threat and consequently 
felt that a joint-negotiated agreement would put them in a stronger bargaining position 
in relation to the employers. Notwithstanding claims by the maritime employers that such 
joint negotiations were easier to handle and therefore welcorne, they cannot have been 
unaware of the maritime unions increased bargaining power. Under pressure from share-
holders, whether private or government, it can be argued that such an increase of bargain-
ing strength would be seen as being undesirable. The subsequent possibility of the forma-
tion of one maritime trade union, with an increased bargaining strength would then be seen 
I 
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as a rea] threat to the ernployers. To some maritime employers, the attraction of having 
four independent unions, who could be played-off, one against the other, would outweigh 
the benefits of one maritin1e union, in that it may present short tern1 sclutions to some 
problerns. 
The failure of the cornposite agreen1ent was largely due to the failure to appreciate the 
significance to ships officers of the meaning of con1petence, and its relationship to status 
and status differentials. The lack of understanding eventually led to the breakdown of the 
Agreen1ent despite the good intentions of all the parties. The problems associated with 
changes in perceived con1petence and relative status reJnain, and given the present organi-
zational structure on board ship, they are likely to remain. Solutions to these problems 
will require a considerably n1ore sophisticated approach than has been atte1npted so far, 
but until such approaches are atten1pted, proble1ns such as wage relativities will continue 
to e1nerge. 
References 
Bain, G .S. and R. Price ( 1972) Who is a white collar worker? British journal of industrial 
relations 10(3): 325-339. 
Jarnieson, R.D. (1976) Report of the conunission of inquiry into Ne\v Zealand shipping 
Wellington. 
More by, D.H. (1975) The hu1nan elen1ent in shipping London, Seatrade. 
Rochdale, Rt. Hon. Viscount (1970) Report of the committee of inquiry into shipping 
London, HMSO CHND 4337. 
Rogne, K. (1977) Improving the quality of working life at sea Conference paper pre-
sented- Work Research Institute, Oslo . 
• 
Smith, M.H. and M.R. Hatfi·eld (1974) The seafaring occupational con1munity Annual 
n2eeting of the society for applied anthropolOKJ' - n1aritime session Leeds. 
Wall, H . R. (1980) Job satisfaction and personality of merchant naval officers Journal 
o[n1aritime policy and management 8(4) : 207-222. 
Whatnall, G.O. (1979) Report of the com1nission of inquiry on New Zealand vessels 
·wellington. 
